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In his essay, Professor Douglas K. Moll identifies and explains the
similarities that closely held limited liability companies (“LLCs”) share
with closely held corporations. 1 In fact, he believes the two entities are so
alike in their vulnerabilities to minority owner oppression that he refers to
them collectively as closely-held enterprises or businesses. 2 Professor Moll
goes through pain-staking effort to describe the issues and concerns of
corporate minority owner oppression. He then explains how corporate
law, over time, has managed to address these problems by providing
manageable solutions through legislative and judicial means. Additionally,
Professor Moll describes the issues facing minority owners of an LLC,
which share striking parallels with corporate minority shareholders. Finally,
he connects all of the dots when he reveals his proposed solution to solve
minority LLC owner oppression by importing the well-developed
corporate solutions into the LLC realm, thus placing both entities under
the same umbrella of minority protection.
Professor Moll’s thesis is that as the problem of minority oppression
is “portable” between the two entities so too should be the solutions. 3
State legislatures and courts need not birth a completely new doctrine
(with the attached growing pains) to deal with minority owner oppression
in an LLC because those same legislatures and courts have already labored
to create the same protections provided to minority corporate
* Jordan Ferrell is a JD/MBA Candidate at The University of Tennessee. He wishes
to thank Professors George Kuney, Joan Heminway, and Eric Amarante for their
guidance and support in the writing of this comment.
1 Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & the Limited Liability Company: Learning (or
Not) from Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 885 (2005).
2 Id.
3 Id.
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shareholders. 4 In other words, Professor Moll declares that legislatures and
courts have already successfully endeavored to protect minority owners in
the corporate setting; consequently, instead of reinventing the wheel over
the next two decades, they simply need to apply that corporate standard
to LLCs by establishing default provisions and subsequent case law to
support an oppression doctrine. 5
I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF MINORITY OPPRESSION
IN THE CORPORATE SETTING
Minority corporate shareholders face exposure to two major concerns:
a lack of exit rights and the effects of majority control. 6 First, a lack of
exit rights results in the “effective confiscation of the minority’s
investment,” because closely-held corporate minority owners: (1) possess
no ready/open markets, resulting in a lack of liquidity (i.e. ownership
interests cannot be sold at a fair price, even if a fair price could be
reasonably determined; a minority interest is also less desirable and less
valuable due to lack of control); (2) are incapable of preventing the
majority from choices that harm the owners’ interests; and (3) suffer their
invested capital being trapped in the entity while the majority decides how
it is used. 7
Second, in addition to financial expectations, members have
participatory expectations due to the likelihood that closely-held
corporations employ their members/owners who look to this employment
for their financial security. 8 Similarly, majority rule may also have a drastic
effect on a minority member’s ability to participate in the business of the
corporation. Some of the risks to minority corporate shareholders include:
(1) termination of the minority’s employment; (2) removal of the minority
from management; and (3) exclusion of the minority from profits of the
venture. 9
Majority rule will be able to terminate the member’s employment and
eliminate that particular income stream, remove the member from the
board of directors, the C-suite, or mid-level management, and finally,
See Anderson v. Wilder, No. E200602647COAR3CV, 2007 WL 2700068, at *3
(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2007).
5 Moll, supra note 1, at 883.
6 Id. at 884, 896.
7 Id. at 896, 899
8 Id. at 883–84.
9 Id. at 884.
4
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separate those shareholders from any voice in how corporate profits are
allocated. With their financial rights essentially held captive, and now being
effectively sidelined from participating in the corporation’s normal
business, minority shareholders are basically completely ostracized from
any level of control in the fate or direction of the corporation or their
capital investment.
II. WHY CORPORATE PROTECTIONS
SHOULD APPLY TO LLCS
To understand how similar minority owners in closely-held
corporations and LLCs are, simply substitute the term “LLC” for
“corporate/corporation” and all else applies nearly the same according to
Professor Moll. 10 Over the last few decades, with the ability to customize
more adeptly than a corporation and at the same time enjoy pass-through
taxation like a partnership, the LLC has become the preferred choice of
business entity on an exponential scale. 11 The sheer increase in volume of
LLCs being formed in comparison to corporations is one of the main
justifications for calls for courts and legislatures to designate protections
for LLCs, just as they do for corporations. 12
States that do not provide default provisions that create possible exits
for owners leave unprotected those parties who are either unsophisticated,
second-generation, or who avoided the understandably uncomfortable
conversations during the honeymoon phases of formation. As such, these
unfortunate parties lack the ability to liquidate their capital investment, are
unable to prevent the majority from taking actions that damage the entity
or minority owners, and are basically trapped into the LLC with no
recourse or remedy. 13
Professor Moll claims that half of states’ LLC laws default to voting
on a per capita basis (one vote per member) while the other half default
to voting on a pro rata basis (vote by financial interest). 14 Voting by a pro
rata basis assures majority control via financial interest. Thus, minority
oppression is possible; however, even a per capita basis is susceptible to
minority oppression should multiple members form a coalition, or voting
Id. at 926.
Id. at 885–86.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 896
14 Id. at 941–42.
10
11
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block, that ostracizes the minority member. 15 Courts have discovered
incidents of minority oppression in the corporate setting when a
controlling group exerts power on an aggregate level; therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that the same may occur in LLCs. 16
III. MINORITY OPPRESSION PROTECTION MIGRATES
FROM MASSACHUSETTS TO TENNESSEE
In fact, Tennessee courts agree with Professor Moll’s views and are
applying corporate majority shareholders’ fiduciary duties to the minority
to LLCs. The pathway from the same standard of fiduciary duty for
partnerships being recognized in LLCs required three decades and a
journey from Massachusetts to Tennessee. First, we must look to
Massachusetts where, in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, the
Supreme Judicial Court discovered the fundamental similarities between
partnerships and closely held corporations, most notably the inherent risk
to minority corporate shareholders. 17 The court held that those
shareholders in close corporations owe the exact same fiduciary duty owed
between partners and that the standard of fiduciary duty owed between
partners is that of the “utmost good faith and loyalty.” 18 One year later,
the same court affirmed its holding and rationale in Wilkes v. Springside
Nursing Home, Inc. 19
The next step in the journey to achieve minority LLC owner
protection in Tennessee required two decades occurring in Nelson v. Martin
where the Tennessee Supreme Court approved of Wilkes and the
reasoning behind protecting the minority corporate shareholder from
majority rule. 20 The final step occurred a decade later in Anderson v. Wilder
Id. at 943–44.
Id. at 944.
17 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975).
18 Id. (citing Cardullo v. Landau, 105 N.E.2d 843, 845 (Mass. 1952)).
19 See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc, 353 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Mass. 1976).
20 Nelson v. Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643, 648 (Tenn. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds
by Trau-Med of Am., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 691, 699 (Tenn. 2002) (citing F.
Hodge O’Neal and Robert Thompson, O’Neals Oppression of Minority Shareholders § 10:04,
at 16 (2d ed. 1995)). In spite of the traditional adherence to majority rule and the business
judgment rule, many courts in this country have moved steadily toward providing a
remedy for oppressed minority shareholders. Some courts have made clear that they will
not apply the business judgment rule unless the directors not only have acted in good
faith, but also have exercised proper care, skill, and diligence. For many courts, the
response has been to impose a fiduciary duty on the controlling shareholders for the
15
16
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where the Tennessee Court of Appeals applied the corporate standard set
forth by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Nelson to LLCs. 21 Upon analysis
of Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-240-102, the court held that “[a] majority
shareholder of an LLC stands in a fiduciary relationship to the minority,
similar to the Supreme Court's teaching in Nelson regarding a corporation,
is warranted in this case. Such a holding does not conflict with the statute,
and is in keeping with the statutory requirement that each LLC member
discharge all of his or her duties in good faith.” 22
IV. ARGUMENT AGAINST CREATING DEFAULT PROVISIONS FOR LLCS:
LLCS ARE GOVERNED BY CONTRACT LAW
The law surrounding LLCs is renowned to be primarily contract law. 23
This allows for the advantageous ability for parties to customize (within
reason) their respective LLC to meet their needs as they see fit. TCA § 48240-102(g) grants a wide berth for parties to draft their articles or
operating agreement to suit their needs and customize the terms to “reflect
the understanding of the parties” as long as the terms are not manifestly
benefit of minority interests. Courts increasingly have been willing to recognize an
enhanced fiduciary duty among shareholders in a close corporation. Id.
21 Anderson v. Wilder, No. E2006-02647-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 2700068, at *3
(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2007).
22 TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-240-102(a)–(b) (2019). The statute states:
(a) Fiduciary Duty of Members of Member-Managed LLC. Except as provided
in the articles or operating agreement, every member of a member-managed
LLC must account to the LLC for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any
profits derived by the member without the consent of the other members from
any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the
LLC or from any use by the member of its property including, but not limited
to, confidential or proprietary information of the LLC or other matters
entrusted to the member as a result of such person’s status as a member.
(b) Standard of Conduct. A member of a member-managed LLC shall
discharge such member’s duties as a member, including all duties as a member
of a committee:
(1) In good faith;
(2) With the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would
exercise under similar circumstances; and
(3) In a manner the member reasonably believes to be in the best interest
of the LLC.
Id.; Anderson v. Wilder, No. E2003-00460-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22768666, at *6 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2003).
23 Moll, supra note 1, at 920.
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unreasonable. 24 Tennessee common law subjects parties to a duty of good
faith and fair dealing in the performance of contracts. 25 In TSC Industries,
Inc. v. Tomlin, the Tennessee Court of Appeals declared, “It is true that
there is implied in every contract a duty of good faith and fair dealing in
its performance and enforcement, and a person is presumed to know the
law.” 26
Professor George Kuney argues that this freedom of navigation
concerning terms that govern LLCs and subsequent reliance on the duty
of good faith and fair dealing are sufficient for all parties to be protected. 27
He favors a system that requires organizers, while drafting the LLC’s
terms, to enter into the negotiations with their eyes wide open because
they and their successors shall be held accountable to their contracting
choices. 28 Professor Kuney recommends that organizing members should
plan accordingly while drafting their operating agreements and keep in
mind that future generations along with heirs apparent will be bound by
those terms. 29
The aspect of LLC law that Professor Kuney prefers, the complete
freedom to contract, is one that Professor Joan Heminway counsels to
reign in to a certain degree. She would prefer that LLCs not be allowed to
contract away all fiduciary duties due to a possible lack of sophistication
of the parties or attorneys. 30 Otherwise, parties may surrender powers and
protections that they may never be able to bargain back.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-240-102(g) (2019). “Modification of Standard of Conduct
in Articles or Operating Agreement. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this
section, the articles or operating agreement may define the standard of conduct in a
manner to reflect the understanding of the parties provided such definition is not
manifestly unreasonable under the circumstances.” Id.
25 Wallace v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 938 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tenn. 1996).
26 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Tomlin, 743 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
27 George Kuney, Lindsay Young Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee
College of Law Continued Legal Education: Connecting the Threads (Sept. 27, 2019),
https://www.rev.com/transcript-editor/Edit?token=MNMJQHP7LQe5vbvLdznMzku
baNhw0AuzbIB-RfdMqJz_sMBvRGNqraFiAlILoL0NDR-Of-s54AtmnqKtG7ecD6jY
OHg&loadFrom=DeliveryEmail&openShareModal=False&page=1&sortBy=Uploade
d&sortOrder=Desc&pageSize=25.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Joan Heminway, Limited Partnership Law: Should Tennessee Follow Delaware’s Lead on
Fiduciary Duty Private Ordering?, BUS. L. PROF BLOG (Sept. 5, 2016), https://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/business_law/2016/09/limited-partnership-law-should-tennessee-follow24
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V. POSSIBLE SOLUTION OF INCLUDING DEFAULT PROVISIONS IN THE
TENNESSEE RULLCA
A. Buy/Sell Provisions in LLC Operating Agreements
The LLC statutes make clear that the legislature’s intent, and one of
the greatest advantages of the LLC form, is to remove restrictive
corporate requirements in favor of a greater degree of latitude in which
the individual LLC may operate within. 31 However, to accomplish that
greater freedom, the LLC organizers must contractually draft the rules that
it will operate by, i.e. the operating agreement. 32 In order to do that
successfully, the organizers must plan for the worst. Professor Moll cites
advance planning as a weakness in closely held enterprises. 33
Whether the onus behind a lack of advance planning for dissension is
attributed to “over-trust” based on familial/friendship relationships or a
lack of sophistication of the parties, the same result occurs in that when
dissension suddenly appears, minority owners find themselves beholden
to the majority, and worse yet, lacking an exit route. 34 Fear of damaging
those aforementioned relationships makes “hard bargaining” more
uncomfortable for the parties (who are likely currently on very pleasant
terms at the inception of the LLC, otherwise, the parties would not be
binding themselves together) than if the LLC was not closely held, and
instead, more “arms-length.” 35 Similar to a hypothetical pre-nuptial
agreement in all marriage licenses, the existence of default rules that plan
for dissension and lay out exit strategies would serve to protect parties that
seek to avoid confrontation during the initial honeymoon phase of LLC
formation. A default buy/sell provision in the operating agreement would
protect unsophisticated parties or attorneys from their own ignorance.
LLCs are relatively simple entities to form and, undoubtedly, numerous
LLCs are formed by parties who do not understand what they are doing

delawares-lead-on-fiduciary-duty-private-ordering.html. Although Professor Heminway’s
post is directed toward limited partnerships, the concepts may be applied to LLCs the
same.
31 Moll, supra note 1, at 958.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 952.
34 Id. at 952.
35 Id. at 954.
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or are represented by legal counsel that is equally inept, either through a
lack of education, experience, or mentor networks. 36
B. Sunset Provisions in LLC Operating Agreements
MBCA jurisdictions allow for shareholder agreements to possess tenyear sunset provisions to protect minority shareholders. 37 Sunset
provisions are those that exist for a defined term before they expire, unless
they are revived by whatever standards in the chartering documents
specify. Similarly, voting trusts may be agreed to for periods of up to 10
years before a mandatory expiration. 38 The renewal of these provisions
might require unanimity, and should that fail, that particular provision will
fall away and the LLC will default to the applicable statutes. The presence
of sunset provisions in Tennessee LLC law would serve two purposes by
protecting: 1) unsophisticated parties from drafting mistakes or omissions,
and 2) future generations and contingent heirs-apparent from being bound
by terms they had no voice in drafting. In essence, parties can contract
away from the default rules as they see fit and then revisit those decisions
every 10 years, allowing the benefit of experience or the introduction of
new parties to determine if those provisions are renewed.
Professor Kuney believes that parties are or should be sophisticated
enough to contract the terms by which they will live under, and that they
should draft with the foresight that future generations of owners will also
be bound to those terms. I believe that expectation, coupled with the
presumption in TSC Industries, Inc. that all parties know the law, assumes
too much from the countless parties that join together to form LLCs, as
well as their chosen counsel. LLCs are relatively easy to form and
undoubtedly, some parties form an LLC without knowing what they are
doing. Even if they seek legal counsel, the quality of that counsel will
depend on the attorney’s education, experience level, and mentor network.
It is much fairer to contingent parties who at some point will be bound
by those contracted terms, but who never had a voice in their drafting due
to, for example, receiving ownership in the LLC as a testamentary gift.
Property law displays the law’s aversion to “dead hand control” with
several doctrines that protect the living above the dead. The existence of
36 Eric Franklin, A Rational Approach to Business Entity Choice, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 573,
595–96 (2016).
37 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32(b)(3) (2003).
38 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.30 (2003).
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sunset provisions as default LLC rules would serve to protect future
generations and contingent heirs-apparent from control from the grave.
CONCLUSION
Based on what I have learned from speaking to esteemed professors
at the University of Tennessee and the University of Houston, Douglas
Moll, George Kuney, Joan Heminway, and Eric Amarante, I would
recommend the inclusion of certain default statutes, including buy/sell
agreements and 10-year sunset provisions, in all LLC operating
agreements. I believe this choice is advantageous because: (1) not all
parties, or their legal counsel, are sophisticated enough to protect minority
members from omissions or the unknown; (2) future generations and
contingent heirs-apparent enjoy some level of protection once they have
a seat at the table; and (3) it also allows for organizing members to avoid
uncomfortable conversations during the honeymoon phase about possible
future dissension while still protecting their respective interests.
A system of default rules where the parties also have a wide latitude
to contract their terms is likely the best environment in which current
minority owners can possess exit rights to activate their liquidity and
protect their capital investments, while also protecting the interests of
future generations who do not yet have a seat at the drafting table.

